6
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
12
0
14
0
−ln(−ln(1−1/T))
Q(
T)
(m
?s)
1 2 5 10 20 50 100
T (years)
l Obs.
WaSiM vhm51
heM
95?bh ??Obs
95?bh ??W aSiM
95?bh heM
Annual max. Q : GEV Distributions for vhm51
Index flood model no. 6
l l l l
l
l l l
l l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
−2 0 2 4 6
0
50
10
0
15
0
−ln(−ln(1−1/T))
Q(
T)
(m
?s)
1 2 5 10 20 50 100
T (years)
l Obs.
WaSiM vhm52
heM
95?bh Obs
95?bh
/media/vedurstofan/utgafa/skyrslur/2014/VI_2014_001.pdf
aversion should influence the first mover’s decision. The
98 Public Choice (2012) 151:91–119
Fi
g.
1
O
pt
im
al
co
n
tr
ib
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tio
n
de
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nd
in
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o
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α
,
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an
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Public Choice (2012) 151:91–119 99
Table 1 The predicted effect of
intrinsic preferences on first and
second movers’ contributions
1st mover 2nd mover
Disadvantageous Negative None
inequity aversion
Advantageous None Positive
inequity
/media/loftslag/Public-Choice-2012---Teyssier---Inequity-and-risk-aversion-in-sequential-public-good-games.pdf
/breakthrough curves
West East
Model C
Model A
Model B
Fractured clay/
Toplayer
Sand Clayey till Limestone SelandienLimestone
0 20 40 60
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
N
or
m
al
is
ed
c
on
ce
nt
ra
ti
on
0 20 40 60 80 100
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0 40 80 120 160 200
Time in years
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
N
or
m
al
is
ed
c
on
ce
nt
ra
ti
on
0 100 200 300
Time in years
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Model A Model B Model C
Simulated
/media/loftslag/Refsgaard_2-uncertainty.pdf