that, the detrended timeseries would have had a net difference of
zero if the negative values had not been set back to zero. This shows that over the 39 years of
data, there was a slight precipitation increase for this grid-point. This trend has been removed,
resulting in a detrended, almost flat dataset.
29
Figure 14. Regression lines for hourly precipitation timeseries of grid-point [100, 100]
from
/media/vedurstofan-utgafa-2022/VI_2022_006_extreme.pdf
grundvelli myndatöku með
flygildum og leysimælitæki (TLS) hefur verið notað við kortlagningu
flóðfara og við mat á útbreiðslu og umfangi hlaupa.
Þétt net jarðskjálftamæla, sem staðsettir eru á jökulskerjum eða
grafnir í jökul, hefur gefið góða raun við ákvörðun á dýpi jarðskjálfta
undir jöklum. Kvikuhreyfingar hafa þannig verið kortlagðar og
myndun gosrása staðfest af meiri nákvæmni en áður. Þó
/media/vedurstofan/utgafa/arsskyrslur/VI_Arsskyrsla_2018_vef.pdf
precipitation and time of year (an index for
available net radiation) (Vehviläinen and Huttunen, 1997). This
equation has been calibrated and verified against observations of
Class A pan evaporation values (Vehviläinen and Huttunen,
1997). The actual evaporation is calculated from potential evapora-
tion and the soil moisture deficit. The changes in temperature and
precipitation affect
/media/ces/Journal_of_Hydrology_Veijalainen_etal.pdf
at
e
(C
limat
e
models
)
GC
M
s
X
X
XX
X
X
X
X
RCM
s
X
X
XX
X
X
X
X
Initia
lco
n
ditions
/
nat
ura
lva
riabilit
y
X
X
XX
X
D
ow
ns
ca
lin
g/
sta
tis
tic
al
co
rr
ec
tio
n
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
W
ate
r
syst
em
impact
s
(H
yd
ro
-e
co
lo
gi
ca
lm
o
de
ls)
X
X
X
X
X
XX
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Socio
-econo
m
ic
imp
act
s
(So
ci
o-
ec
on
om
ic
to
ol
s)
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
XX
X
X
X
A
da
pt
ati
on
m
ea
su
re
s
X
X
X
X
/media/loftslag/2012-Refsgaard_etal-uncertainty_climate-change-adaptation-MITI343.pdf
aversion should influence the first mover’s decision. The
98 Public Choice (2012) 151:91–119
Fi
g.
1
O
pt
im
al
co
n
tr
ib
u
tio
n
de
pe
nd
in
g
o
n
α
,
r
an
d
p
Public Choice (2012) 151:91–119 99
Table 1 The predicted effect of
intrinsic preferences on first and
second movers’ contributions
1st mover 2nd mover
Disadvantageous Negative None
inequity aversion
Advantageous None Positive
inequity
/media/loftslag/Public-Choice-2012---Teyssier---Inequity-and-risk-aversion-in-sequential-public-good-games.pdf