development:
Experiences from the SCENES project
Kasper Kok a,, Mathijs van Vliet a, Ilona Bärlund c, Anna Dubel b, Jan Sendzimir b
a Wageningen University, P.O. Box 47, 6700 AA Wageningen, Netherlands
b International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Schlossplaz 1, A-2361 Laxenburg, Austria
c Helmholtz Centre for Environmental Research (UFZ), Brückstrasse 3a, 39114 Magdeburg, Germany
a r t i c
/media/loftslag/Kok_et_al._TFSC_published_2011.pdf
no
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.(
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.(
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Alread
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ar
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rth
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)
Raadgeve
re
t
al
.(
200
8),
Pahl-Wos
te
t
al
.(
2007
c),
Vos
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.(
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13
.Flexibl
e
measures
,
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option
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ope
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Measure
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o
r
propose
d
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rth
/media/loftslag/Huntjens_etal-2010-Climate-change-adaptation-Reg_Env_Change.pdf
(Quante and Colijn, 2016). Work on risk analysis and adaptation is in different
stages in the countries of the world.
Coastal floods have caused problems in Iceland in the past (Jóhannsdóttir, 2017) and are likely to do
so in the future as well. Large coastal floods can be expected in Iceland every 10 - 20 years and the
probability of such events can rise with climate change (Almannavarnir, 2011
/media/vedurstofan-utgafa-2020/VI_2020_005.pdf
scenario
development, with an example from Brazil
Kasper Kok *
Land Dynamics, Department of Environmental Sciences, Wageningen University, P.O. Box 47, 6700 AA Wageningen, The Netherlands
1. Introduction
The world is undergoing rapid changes while globalising
constantly, which gives the consideration of the future new
urgency and importance. Scenario development has emerged as a
key method when taking
/media/loftslag/Kok_JGEC658_2009.pdf
extensively used in experimental economics over the
past 20 years. One robust result is that a considerable percentage of individuals voluntar-
ily cooperate, even though the Nash equilibrium is to contribute nothing to the public good
(see Anderson 2001 and Ledyard 1995, for reviews).3 Once we drop the homo-œconomicus
hypothesis, by assuming that either all agents have social preferences or agents
/media/loftslag/Public-Choice-2012---Teyssier---Inequity-and-risk-aversion-in-sequential-public-good-games.pdf